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THE DILEMMA OF THE LOCAL SOCIAL
INVESTMENT: AN ESSAY ON 'SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE' INVESTING
Edward A. Zelinsky*
INTRODUCTION

Like any political movement that seeks to change the status quo
in a dramatic way, the drive for the "socially responsible" investment
of pension and endowment funds has generated many questions about
the nature, scope, and propriety of its aims. Among the varied issues
that have emerged from the debate over social investing, perhaps none
has been more sharply argued than the propriety of such investing as
evaluated under the traditional criteria of fiduciary law.
Historically, fiduciaries have been required to diversify the assets
under their control and to seek the highest rate of return consistent
with the preservation of those assets.' Some opponents of social in
vesting contend that the often suggested criteria for social investments
will inhibit the diversification of fiduciaries' portfolios and will lead to
lower rates of return than would otherwise be obtainable.^ If, for ex
ample, a pension plan cannot invest in nonunion companies, the uni
verse of available investments will be constricted. Under this analysis,
the pension trustee proscribed from making profitable nonunion in
vestments will develop a less diverse and less profitable portfolio than
the trustee not so proscribed.
To the proponents of social investing, there is no insuperable in
compatibility between the investment criteria they propose and the
fiduciary's traditional obligations to diversify and make productive
the funds under his control.^ Diversification, under this view, can be
achieved with relatively few investments. From this perspective, there
is no reason to believe that companies with factories in South Africa
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University;
B.A. 1972, M.A., J.D., 1975, M. Phil., 1978, Yale University. I would like to express my
thanks to my colleagues at Cardozo Law School, Professors Paul Shupack, Arthur Jacobson,
Stewart Sterk, John Hanks, and Steve Nemerson; my research assistant, Mrs. Joanne Myers, of
the Cardozo class of 1984, and my most severe critic, Doris Zelinsky.
• See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 13-17.
3 Id.
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will necessarily have higher rates of return than firms with no estab
lishments in that country.
As a modest contribution to this debate, I suggest that the rela
tionship among social investing, diversification, and rates of return
can best be evaluated if we distinguish between two types of social
investments: the "local" social investment and the "global" social in
vestment. The former is an investment that, in addition to its direct
rate of return, generates secondary economic benefits for the fiduci
ary's beneficiaries. In many instances, the local social investment will,
because of these extra benefits, yield a higher rate of return than more
traditional investments. On the other hand, the local social invest
ment—precisely because of its local nature—will be among the least
diversifying of the investments available to the fiduciary. The para
dox of the local social investment—its high rate of return but undiversified nature—forms the core of my analysis.
Central to my position is the concept, widely accepted among
economists but as yet unfamiliar to fiduciary law, of the externality,
i.e., the secondary financial benefit generated by an economic activity.
It is not surprising that the jurisprudence of fiduciary obligation has
not addressed the question of externalities since that body of law
traces its origins to a preurbanized, preindustrial world where exter
nalities were less common than they are today."*
I suggest that the fiduciary's obligation to maximize his rate of
return is appropriately characterized as an obligation to maximize a
rate of return that includes the beneficiary's portion of any externali
ties. So defined, the fiduciary's obligations would not simply permit,
but often would compel, the local social investment on the basis of
rate of return. Phrased differently, the rate of return on the local so
cial investment, calculated to account for its externalities to the bene
ficiary, will often be higher than the return on traditional, nonsocial
investments.
Life, however, is never simple. While local social investments
will often be the most productive investments available to a fiduciary,
generally they will also be the least diversifying. Typically, the fiduci
ary will already have a major investment in the locality to be benefited
by the proposed local social investment. Thus, ironically, one tradi
tional criterion of fiduciary law (rate of return) will frequently impel
the fiduciary to make local social investments while another criterion
(diversification) will generally forbid it. This is the dilemma of the
local social investment.
See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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To resolve this dilemma, I propose that a specific category of
investments be recognized as a matter of fiduciary law. This category
would be denoted "reciprocal local social investments" and would re
flect the fiduciary's power (and perhaps compulsion) to make the local
social investment of another fiduciary in return for that second fiduci
ary's agreement to make a reciprocal investment of the assets under
his control.
I will develop my analysis in seven steps. First, I will create four
examples that will be used throughout this Article. Second, I will
examine the background of social investing and will amplify the dis
tinction between the local social investment and the global social in
vestment. Third, I will briefly explore the legal framework presently
controlling the investment obligations of fiduciaries. Fourth, I will
analyze the economist's concept of the externality. Fifth, I will ex
amine how the local social investment, because of its externalities, will
often be the most productive, if least diversifying, investment avail
able to the fiduciary. Sixth, I will introduce the concept of the recip
rocal local social investment as an addition to the body of fiduciary
law and will outline the manner in which a nationwide clearinghouse
could facilitate the reciprocation of local social investments. Finally,
I will examine some potential objections to my analysis.
I.

FOUR EXAMPLES

To advance my various themes, I will utilize four examples. The
first involves a university located in an urban setting in the city of
Westville, a middle-sized community in New England. The univer
sity is well endowed. The most recent valuation of the university's
investment portfolio concluded that the university's income produc
ing assets are worth $300 million. The campus itself is a major hold
ing of the university, valued by the local assessor at $100 million.
Parts of the university's campus abut the downtown area of Westville.
In recent years, the downtown area has stagnated. Of the university's
investment portfolio, $50 million represents commercial real estate in
downtown Westville.
To revitalize downtown, the city of Westville recruits an exper
ienced out-of-state developer to acquire, refurbish, and upgrade sev
eral blocks of downtown real estate. The developer needs financing.
More particularly, the developer needs a mortgage below market rates
for his proposal to work. The developer and the city approach the
university for a loan for the developer. That loan would be made
from the university's endowment fund and would be in the amount of
$10 million, for ten years, at an 8% rate of return. The proceeds
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would be invested exclusively in the developer's downtown project.
The university's endowment advisors indicate that, if the university
rejects the loan request, it could obtain 10% return by investing the
funds elsewhere.
There is no local source available for the proposed mortgage
other than the university's endowment. If the university does not
agree to the city's proposal, there will apparently be no downtown
project.^
At the same time that the university has before it the proposal
from the city and the developer, the university is being pressured by
certain segments of its student body to divest the stocks of specified
corporations that depend heavily on military contracts. These stocks
currently generate a return of 10%. The university's advisors believe
that, if these stocks are sold, the proceeds could not be reinvested at
that rate of return and would therefore generate a lesser income to the
university.
My second example pertains to the profit-sharing plan of a cor
poration that is in the home construction business in the industrial
midwest. Under the terms of the plan, one-third of the corporation's
pretax profits are automatically contributed to the plan. The plan sat
isfies the legal requirements of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code")
for profit-sharing arrangements.^ The participants in the plan are the
employees of the corporation who have attained twenty-five years of
age. The corporation's nonmanagement employees are paid on an
hourly basis. The president and the treasurer of the corporation serve
as trustees for the assets contributed to the plan.
In Elmtown, the community where the corporation does the bulk
of its business, the homebuilding market has stagnated because of
high mortgage rates and the lack of available mortgage money. Con
sequently, for the past three years, the corporation has had no profits
and thus has made no contribution to the profit-sharing plan. Indeed,
most nonmanagement employees of the corporation have been work
ing substantially less than forty hours per week.
The corporation is approached by its employees with the follow
ing proposal: The trustees will sell certain long-term corporate bonds
held by the profit-sharing plan. The plan earns a rate of return of
' For those who suspect that this example is something of a roman d clef, see Yale Chips
in For New Haven, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1983, § 4, at E7, col. 3; Yale Ponders Shubert Invest
ment, New Haven Reg., Nov. 20, 1982, at 30, col. 3. In the interests of full disclosure, I should
note that I serve as a member of the Board of Aldermen of New Haven and voted for the city's
participation in both of the projects described in these articles.
6 I.R.C. § 401. All statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
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13% on these bonds. These bonds total $2 million and represent onetenth of the plan's current assets. The proceeds from the sale of the
bonds will be conveyed to a local savings bank that will, on behalf of
the plan, loan the proceeds for new home construction mortgages in
Elmtown. For the first three years, each mortgage will bear an inter
est rate of 11%, 2% less than the return the plan could otherwise
obtain. In the fourth year, and for each year thereafter, each mort
gage's interest rate will automatically adjust to market levels. Hence,
the prospective mortgagor will receive a subsidy during the first three
years he owns his house.
While the trustees contemplate this proposal, they are asked by a
local environmental group to divest their portfolio of all securities is
sued by companies that produce certain artificial pesticides, and to
invest the proceeds in the newly issued stock of a corporation that
produces experimental equipment for industrial solar heating compo
nents designed for Florida and other southern states. The securities
proposed for divestiture bear an average rate of return of 15%. The
stock of the solar equipment company is highly speculative, as the
company has yet to pay any dividends.
My third example involves the pension plan maintained by a na
tional, nonprofit church organization for its full-time salaried employ
ees. The organization provides a variety of administrative and
educational services to local, affiliated churches. Affiliation is purely
voluntary and may be terminated by the church at any time. The
organization's pension plan satisfies the requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code' and is of the defined benefit variety,® i.e., upon attain
ing age 65, each employee is guaranteed a specific annual pension re
gardless of the plan's investment performance during the employee's
working career. In particular, each employee is assured, upon his re
tirement, an annual pension equal to 60% of his average yearly salary
as of the end of his employment.
Each year, the plan's professional actuary determines the level of
funding that the organization must contribute to the plan. The organ
ization's funds come from two major sources. First, each affiliated
church makes a mandatory payment based on the size of the church's
congregation. In addition, the organization's staff conducts direct7 Id.
8 In a defined benefit pension plan, the employer pays a specified benefit at the employee's
retirement. Such benefit is calculated from a formula that is part of the plan. The employer's
contribution is based on an actuarial valuation of how much money will be needed to fund the
promised benefit upon the employee's retirement. Hager & Zimpleman, The Norris Decision,
Its Implications and Application, 32 Drake L. Rev. 913, 934 (1983).
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mail fundraising appeals principally aimed at the congregants of the
affiliated churches.
Throughout its history, the organization has been involved in a
number of political and religious controversies. Frequently, affiliated
churches have responded to these controversies by terminating or sus
pending their memberships in the organization. The organization's
income is directly and adversely affected when a church departs in
this fashion.
To protect the plan's participants, the church organization has
elected to participate in the federally sponsored insurance program of
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).® In return for an
annual premium, the PBGC insures a basic retirement benefit for each
participant in the plan.
The following proposal has been advanced to the plan's trustees:
$10 million of the pension assets under their control will be loaned to
churches that are located in impoverished rural and urban areas
throughout the nation, and that are in the process of erecting new
buildings or expanding or improving old ones. The trustees, as secur
ity for the loans, will receive mortgages from the borrowing churches.
The churches will each borrow at an 8% rate of return for a ten-year
term. This is 2% less than the return the trustees could otherwise
obtain. Each borrowing church will enter into a contract with the
organization, committing the church to affiliate with the organization
until its loan is paid off in full.
Simultaneously, the trustees have been urged by a caucus of
churches to sell all pension holdings of companies that have factories
or branch offices in South Africa, that sell to companies with such
factories or offices, or that sell to the government of South Africa.
The resulting funds would be invested in other, listed companies. The
holdings affected under this proposal currently generate an aggregate
return of 10%. The companies in question constitute a large percent
age of the firms listed on the New York and American stock ex
changes. Outside investment counsel has indicated that, if the plan
invests in the remaining firms on the two exchanges, it can expect a
rate of return lower than 10%.
A fourth and final example pertains to the public employees' pen
sion plan of a small New England state. The managers of the plan
® For an introduction to the federal insurance of pension plans, see the legislative reports
accompanying The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, H.R. Rep. No. 533,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 935, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4639, 4652-54,
4662-64, 5142-61, & 5171.
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have been approached by local real estate interests to commit $5 mil
lion for thirty-year, fixed-rate, low-interest mortgages.
Under the proposal, funds from the state pension plan would be
used for mortgages to first-time home buyers who purchase or build
anywhere in the state. These mortgages would bear a permanent rate
of 10%. That rate is 2% less than the plan could otherwise obtain
and 3% less than the current rate for thirty-year, fixed-rate, low-inter
est mortgages.
The state does not levy an income tax. It does, however, levy a
7% sales tax, which applies to the materials purchased for new home
construction. The state also imposes a 7% real estate conveyance tax
levied on the gross sales price of all real property sold within the
boundaries of the state. The state's financial position, while not with
out its problems, is essentially acceptable.
The plan is of the defined contribution type.^° Each year, the
state contributes for each employee participating in the plan an
amount equal to 5% of the employee's salary in that year. Upon re
tirement, the employee is entitled to the state's cumulative contribu
tions on his behalf plus the cumulative earnings attributable to those
contributions.
II.

LOCAL SOCIAL INVESTMENTS AND GLOBAL
SOCIAL INVESTMENTS

The proposals to our hypothetical university, corporation,
church organization, and state pension plan typify what has come to
be called the social investment. The concept of the social investment
is one that has emerged relatively recently with the recognition that
the assets of institutions, such as pension and profit-sharing plans,
foundations, and university endowments, are of significant magni
tude." Among the reasons for this growth is the favorable tax treat
ment afforded to contributions to these institutions and to the
institutions' earnings."
If the growth of pension, university, and foundation assets was
the factual predicate to the demand for social investing, the case for
10 In a defined contribution plan, the amount of contribution to be made by the employer,
rather than the level of benefits to be provided to the employee upon retirement, is specified in
the plan. Hager & Zimpleman, supra note 8, at 935-36.
11 On the size of these funds, see Assets Surge to $806 Billion, Pensions and Investment
Age, Jan. 23, 1984, at 3; College Endowments Grow by Millions With Surge in Market, N.Y.
Times, July 23, 1983, at A5, col. 2.
12 I.R.C. §§ 170, 401(a), 404(a), 501(a). Section 170(a) allows a tax deduction for charita
ble contributions. A charitable contribution is defined generally in § 170(c) as a contribution
or gift to:
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social investing still requires acceptance of a key normative premise;
fiduciaries, in making investment decisions, may (or must) consider
the political, economic, and social effects of those investments.
Over the last decade or so, there has developed increasing inter
est in deploying pension and endowment assets to further social
goals.Universities have been pressured to divest their portfolios of
the stock of corporations doing business in South Africa."^ State and
1) A state, the United States, a possession of the United States, a political
subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia provided that the contribution is
made for exclusively public purposes.
2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation—
A) created or organized in the United States, any state, the District of
Columbia, or any possession of the United States; and
B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, national or international amateur sport competi
tion, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
3) other organizations listed in § 170(c)(3), (4), (5).
Section 401(a) lists the requirements for qualification as a pension, profit-sharing, or stock
bonus plan.
Section 404(a) allows a tax deduction for contributions paid by an employer to an em
ployee's stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or deferred-payment plan.
Section 501(a) exempts certain organizations, specifically those described in §§ 401(a),
501(c), and 501(d) from taxation. Section 501(c) includes, among other things, a corporation,
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari
table, scientific, public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster a national or inter
national amateur sports organization, or for the prevention of cruelty to animals and children.
The hypothetical university, corporation, state, and church described in this Article, see
supra text accompanying notes 5-10, would all be afforded favorable tax treatment under the
Code.
Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Standards for Governing Investment of Pension Assets for
Social and Political Goals, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1340, 1342-43 (1980); Lanoff, The Social Invest
ment of Private Pension Plan Assets; May It Be Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 Lab. L.J.
387, 387 (1980); Lynn, Investing Pension Funds for Social Goals Requires Changing the Law,
53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 101, 101 (1981); Schotland, Should Pension Funds Be Used to Achieve
'Social' Goals? (pt. 1), Tr. & Est., Sept. 1980, at 10, 11 (later articles in this three part series are
found in Tr. & Est., Oct. 1980, and Tr. & Est., Nov. 1980); Investment Challenge, Pensions &
Investment Age, Sept. 17, 1984, at 59, col. 5 (letter of John C. Harrington); Stand on S. Africa
Needs Challenge, Pensions & Investment Age, Aug. 20, 1984, at 8, col. 1; Schlesinger, Invest
ing Based on Social Issues is Gaining Adherents Among the Children of the '60s, Wall St. J.,
July 11, 1984, § 2, at 33, col. 4; Anti-Apartheid Pension Policies Criticized by Some Fund
Managers, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1984, § 2, at 33, col. 4; Shapiro, Doing Well While Doing
Good, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1983, § 3, at 17, col. 1; Funds with a Conscience, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 20, 1983, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Brody, Pure-Play Investments: Socially Sensitive Portfolios Are
Gaining in Popularity, Barron's, Jan. 24, 1983, at 13, col. 1; 'Power' Is the Real Social Issue,
Pensions & Investment Age, Dec. 6, 1982, at 10, col. 1 (editorial); 'Socially Responsible' Funds
Pique Interest, But Results Often Have Been Unimpressive, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1982, § 2, at
33, col. 4; Financial Institutions Show Interest In Socially Responsive Investing, 14 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1752, 1752-53 (Oct. 15, 1982).
See Note, Socially Responsible Investment of Public Pensions Funds: The South Africa
Issue and State Law, 10 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 407, 412 (1980-81); Harvard Won't
Bolster Anti-Apartheid Policies, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1984, § 2, at 46, col. 2; Campbell, More
Municipalities Joining Drive to Cut South Africa Links, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1984, at Al,
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local government pension funds have been used to provide mortgages
for homeowners within the governments' respective boundaries and to
encourage economic development.'' Foundations have been asked to
refrain from investing in corporations that work on Pentagon con
tracts.'^ Unions have demanded that pension funds be invested only
in unionized corporations.The list could go on.
col. 6; N.Y.C. Trustees Approve Resolution on South Africa, Pensions & Investment Age,
Aug. 20, 1984, at 40, col. 1; Phased-In Divestiture Urged, Pensions & Investment Age, July
23, 1984, at 34, col. 1; Dunlap, Some Trustees Want City Pension Funds to Cut Pretoria Ties,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1984, at Al, col. 6; Labor Letter: South Africa's Racial Policies Force
Pension Funds to Shed Some Stock Holdings, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 5; Wesleyan
to Sell S. African Stock, New Haven Reg., Feb. 5, 1984, at 10, col. 1; South Africa Ties Broken
by Yalies, New Haven Reg., Dec. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Apartheid Foes Push Yale Divestment,
New Haven Reg., Dec. 11, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Divesting Report Released, New Haven JournalCourier, Dec. 6, 1983, at 16, col. 2; Apartheid Resolution Rejected at Columbia, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 1983, § 1, at 17, col. 4; Penn, Investing in South Africa: Moral Issue With a Bottom
Line, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1983, § 3, at 2, col. 3; University to Protest New Divestiture Law,
Pensions & Investment Age, May 2, 1983, at 19, col. 1; Bond, U.S. Foes of Apartheid Curb
South Africa Investment, New Haven Journal-Courier, Apr. 18, 1983, at 10, col. 3 (editorial);
Michigan Regents Bob and Weave, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, § 4, at 7, col. 2; Ann Arbor
Argues State Stock Rule, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1983, at A7, col. 1; The States and Apartheid,
Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1983, § 2, at 33, col. 1; Shunning South Africa, Bus. Wk., Jan. 17, 1983, at
44, col. 4; UAW-Chrysler Pension Fund Trustees Asked Not to Invest in Nine Companies, 10
Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 470, at 1729 (Nov. 14, 1983).
15 See Murphy, Regulating Public Employee Retirement Systems for Portfolio Efficiency,
67 Minn. L. Rev. 211,216, 223-24 (1982); California Auditor: Small Public Funds Not in Step
with Law, Pensions & Investment Age, Sept. 17, 1984, at 27, col. 4; State's 4-Way Venture
Capital Plan Aims for Double Benefit, N.Y. Post, Feb. 9, 1984, at 46, col. 2; New York State
Retirement Fund Plans Venture-Capital Investment, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1983, at B2, col. 1;
State to Switch Funds to Industry, N.Y. Post, Dec. 26, 1983, at 33, col. 6; Prial, New Pension
Fund Role: Saving Housing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1983, § 8, at 7, col. 2; Ruhe & Westerbeck,
Pension Plans Cornerstone in Pittsburgh Development, Pensions & Investment Age, May 2,
1983, at 1, col. 3; Sahgal, Pensions Could Add Zest to State's Capital Pool, Pensions & Invest
ment Age, May 2, 1983, at 21, col.l; Gov. Cuomo: 'I Intend to do More with Less', N.Y. Post,
Jan. 10, 1983, at 32, col. 5 (letter of Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of New York); Gallagher,
Use $16B Pension Fund to Build State Economy, N.Y. Post, Oct. 25, 1982, at 29, col. 1 (edito
rial); At Least $60 Million Set as Yankee Mac Offering, New Haven Journal-Courier, May 18,
1982, at 1, col. 1; State Makes $300 Million Available for Mortgages, N.Y. Times, May 6,
1982, at D17, col. 3; Investment Unit Report Discusses Use of Plan Assets to Stimulate Econ
omy, 10 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 429, at 183, 183 (Jan. 31, 1983); Cuomo to Continue Drive to
Use Pension Funds to Aid State Economy, 9 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 418, at 1576, 1576 (Nov.
8, 1982); Legislature in Midst of Revamping Investment Practices of Largest Funds, 9 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) No. 416, at 1485, 1486 (Oct. 25, 1982).
'6 See Glynn, Pulpit Politics, New Republic, Mar. 14, 1983, at 11, 13; Church Questions
Singer's Military Rule, New Haven Reg., May 11, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
I'' See Kaiser, Labor's New Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage—Can Labor Legally Beat its
Plowshares into Swords?, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 409, 412 (1982); Note, The Employee Retire
ment Income Security Act of 1974 and Union Influence in Pension Fund Investment Deci
sions, 12 Fordham Urb. L.J. 151, 157-59 (1984); Unions Discovering the Pension-Fund Vote,
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1983, § 3, at 4, col. 3; Carpenters Invest in a Subdivision, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 24, 1983, § 8, at 1, col. 5; California Unions Pour Money into Mortgages, Pensions &
Investment Age, Nov. 22, 1982, at 14, col. 1; Plumbers Union Local Announces Program for
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These demands insist that the investment decisions of fiduciaries
neither be limited to traditional economic criteria (e.g., What is the
rate of return? Will the investment appreciate in the future?), nor be
concerned only with the welfare of the designated beneficiary of the
assets in question (e.g., the government employee, the university
budget, the union's retiree). Instead, these demands require the fidu
ciary to consider the impact of his investment decisions on society.
The investment is to be social in the sense that the private interest of
the fiduciary's beneficiary is not alone to control. The impact of the
investment on others is to be considered as well.
The concept of social investing would introduce into the fiduci
ary relationship new parties and considerations. Traditionally, the fi
duciary relationship has been viewed as a two-party affair involving
one person (i.e., the trustee, the executor, the administrator) who
holds and manages property for the benefit of a second (i.e., the trust
beneficiary, the legatee, the heir). Consequently, the focus of conven
tional fiduciary jurisprudence is the regulation of this bilateral
relationship.'®
The advocates of social investing would redefine the fiduciary re
lationship as a three-party affair involving the fiduciary, the benefici
ary, and society as a whole.
It is here that I advance the distinction between a local social
investment and a global social investment. For among the third party
"others," whose welfare may be affected by the fiduciary's decisions,
are the fiduciary's beneficiaries themselves. When municipal pension
monies are used for low-interest mortgages, among those benefiting
from such mortgages are the pension plan participants who live in the
city and who take mortgages from the plan. If our hypothetical uni
versity makes the requested loan to the proposed developer, one of the
adjoining property owners whose real estate will benefit will be the
university itself.
A social investment that takes place in the fiduciary's backyard
may yield some of its "social" advantage to the fiduciary's beneficiary.
It is this type of investment that I would label the "local" social in
vestment in contradistinction to the "global" social investment.
Admittedly, the distinction is often one of degree: if the univer
sity were asked to fund a project three miles from its campus and real
estate holdings, the university would still derive some of the social
Investing Plan Assets in Mortgages, 10 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 437, at 552, 552 (Mar. 28,
1983); Financial Institutions Show Interest in Socially Responsive Investing, 14 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1752, 1753 (Oct. 15, 1982).
See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
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benefit, though perhaps not as much as it would derive from a project
immediately adjacent to the campus. A project ten miles away might
generate even less social benefit for the university. Although the dif
ference is often one of degree rather than kind, the distinction be
tween local and global social investments remains a useful one.
III.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING FIDUCIARY
INVESTMENT DECISIONS: A BRIEF REVIEW

Historically, the supervision of fiduciaries was a task performed
by the courts of equity. Consequently, our oldest sources of fiduciary
jurisprudence are the case law criteria that outline the traditional re
sponsibilities of trustees and executors.'^
Because of the possibilities for abuse inherent in the fiduciary's
position, the courts of equity protected the interests of the beneficiary
by imposing certain affirmative duties on the fiduciary and proscribing
other actions inimical to the welfare of the beneficiary.^® Even today,
the executor of an estate or the trustee of a private trust remains the
classic fiduciary, holding and managing property for the benefit of
someone other than himself.
The courts of equity performed two major tasks when they de
fined the obligations of the fiduciary. First, they postulated that the
fiduciary's prime responsibility is to his beneficiary. The fiduciary
must avoid even the appearance of violating that responsibility and
must avoid enriching himself at his beneficiary's expense.^' Second,
the courts indicated that the fiduciary must protect the assets under
his control through prudent investment decisions that result in the
diversification of those assets and that achieve a reasonable rate of
For the classic common law case, see Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446
(1830).
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable
income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.
Id. at 461. The responsibilities of the modem trustee are most often described in the tmst
instrument. In the absence of such explicit delineation, those responsbilities are generally com
prised of the duty of loyalty and the duty not to delegate, to keep and render accounts, and to
exercise reasonable skill and care in the adminstration of the trust. 2 A. Scott, The Law of
Trusts § 164, at 1254-55 (3d ed. 1967).
20 For example, in the absence of express provisions in the trust instrument, courts of eq
uity have imposed certain duties, such as the duty of loyalty, while proscribing certain activi
ties such as selling land, chattels, and securities, or borrowing money from the trust. 2 A.
Scott, supra note 19, § 164, at 1254, 1256.
21 G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 541, at 157 (rev. 2d ed.
1977).
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return. The fiduciary is to diversify and make productive the assets
under his control because that is how the prudent man manages his
own investments.^^ The fiduciary's beneficiaries are entitled to noth
ing less.
Hence, a trustee who receives trust property consisting solely of
cash must, absent special permission from the grantor, diversify his
holdings into other types of investments. He cannot keep excessive
amounts of monies in noninterest bearing accounts, since the benefi
ciaries are entitled to have the assets of the trust invested in a produc
tive manner.^^ Indeed, an executor will have dilSculty justifying the
retention of cash balances in low-interest accounts for an unreasona
ble period of time.^'*
In the twentieth century, the courts have extended the traditional
rules of fiduciary law to nontraditional fiduciaries, for example, to the
trustees of private foundations and universities.^'
The decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court regarding
the Duke Endowment are the leading cases involving the charitable
trustee's duty to diversify and maximize trust assets.^® They also
highlight the increasing federalization of fiduciary regulation through
the Internal Revenue Code and other federal statutes. Somewhat
ironically, these decisions arose not from a situation in which the
trustees failed to diversify or seek a high rate of return, but from one
in which the grantor of the charitable trust forbade them to do so.
In 1924, James B. Duke created a charitable trust known as the
Duke Endowment. In the indenture creating the endowment, Duke
22 Id. § 612, at 18-20.
23 2 A. Scott, supra note 19, § 181, at 1463.
24 Id. § 180.3, at 1457.
25 See G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, supra note 21, § 391, at 206-07; e.g.. Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W.2d 29 (1940) (trustees of private hospital held to traditional stan
dard of fiduciary care). For a recent application of the traditional fiduciary law in the context
of a pension plan, see Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), afFd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979). In Withers, the trustees of a New York City
municipal pension plan invested pension funds in "highly speculative" New York City bonds.
Some beneficiaries of the plan contended that the trustees violated their fiduciary duty by
purchasing the bonds and by investing with the objective of rescuing the city from bankruptcy
instead of enhancing the fund. In holding that the trustee's decision to invest in New York
City bonds was prudent in light of the fact that the city was the major contributor and guaran
tor of the funds, the court reiterated the traditional responsibility of fiduciaries to exercise
prudence in the care of the funds entrusted to them: "The classic statement of the 'prudent
man rule' in New York is that 'the trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such pru
dence in the care and management [of the fund], as, in general, prudent men of discretion and
intelligence in such matters, employ in their own affairs.' " Id. at 1254 (quoting King v. Tal
bot, 40 N.Y. 76, 85-86 (1869)).
26 See Davison v. Duke Univ., 282 N.C. 676, 194 S.E.2d 761 (1973); Cocke v. Duke Univ.,
260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963).
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designated Duke University and a variety of eleemosynary institutions
in North and South Carolina as the recipients of the trust's income.
Duke further provided that the trustees were generally to invest the
endowment's assets in the securities of, or loans to, the Duke Power
Company or one of its subsidiaries. Under limited circumstances, the
trustees could invest assets in specified types of government bonds.
Other types of investments were generally forbidden.^'
By 1961, the trust owned stocks and bonds of the Duke Power
Company worth $393,695,928. The trustees owned 57% of the voting
stock of the Duke Power Company. Seven of the sixteen directors of
the Duke Power Company were trustees of the endowment. These
stocks and bonds constituted, by value, over 80% of the endowment's
assets.^®
The trustees, concerned about the undiversified nature of the
trust's portfolio, petitioned the North Carolina courts to amend the
trust indenture to permit investments in stocks and bonds other than
those of the Duke Power Company and its subsidiaries. The lower
court, impressed by the testimony of "investment experts" that "a
greater degree of diversification is necessary, under general trust in
vestment principles," acceded to the trustees' request and modified
the indenture to provide for a broad range of investments. The court
concluded that the situation in which the trust found itself constituted
an "emergency" justifying the judicial modification of the trust
indenture.^'
The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed. It may ordina
rily be, the court noted, "that a prudent person does not carry all his
eggs in one basket."^® James B. Duke, however, was no ordinary per
son. The creator of the American Tobacco Corporation, Duke was a
giant of industry on a par with John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Car
negie. The provisions of the trust indenture were carefully and delib
erately developed by Duke and his attorney. The Supreme Court
would not interfere with Duke's considered decision to restrict the
trustees to an undiversified portfolio. The lower court was reversed.^'
The saga, however, did not end there.
After the Tax Reform Act of 1969^^ added section 4943 to the
Internal Revenue Code, the trustees were confronted with the neces27 Cocke V. Duke Univ., 260 N.C. 1, 6, 131 S.E.2d 909, 911-12 (1963).
28 Id. at 13, 131 S.E.2d at 916.
29 Id. at 14, 131 S.E.2d at 917.
30 Id. at 20, 131 S.E.2d at 921.
31 Id. at 22, 131 S.E.2d at 922.
32 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 509,
532-37.
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sity of divesting themselves of some of the endowment's Duke Power
stock or paying penalty taxes for excess business holdings.^^ Section
4943 generally forbids private foundations from holding controlling
interests in corporations and businesses.^"^ The adoption of section
4943 thus forced the trustees to sell some of their Duke Power stock.
The indenture required the trustees to invest the proceeds of that
stock in government obligations. Constrained by these restrictions,
the trustees argued that the trust's already poor investment perform
ance would deteriorate further.^'
This time the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the
trustees and authorized them to invest trust assets in a wide range of
stocks and bonds. The passage of section 4943 was viewed by the
court as enough of an emergency to override James Duke's restric
tions on the trustees' investment powers.^®
The Duke Endowment cases reflect the historic framework gov
erning charitable fiduciaries. The authorities relied upon by the
North Carolina courts were the case law decisions defining the rules
pertaining to private trusts. These cases impose a basic duty to diver
sify and make productive the assets held by charitable fiduciaries.
The charitable trustee, like the private trustee, must treat the funds
confided to him as the prudent man would treat his personal
resources.
The fiduciary obligations established by the courts have, in many
situations, been statutorily reinforced and elaborated upon by Con
gress. Congress grants exemptions from and deductions for federal
tax purposes, in order to encourage certain types of institutions Con
gress deems worthy of financial support.^"' In effect, the federal fisc
subsidizes these institutions by declining to tax their income and by
reducing the tax of those who contribute to these institutions.^® To
ensure that federal support of eleemosynary institutions achieves its
I.R.C. § 4943; see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
I.R.C, § 4943(c); see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
Davison v. Duke Univ., 282 N.C. 676, 194 S.E.2d 761 (1973).
Id. at 694-95, 194 S.E.2d at 772-73.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983);
Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is ad
ministered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a
cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its
income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a
portion of the individual's contributions. The system Congress has enacted pro
vides this kind of subsidy to nonprofit civic welfare organizations generally, and an
additional subsidy to those charitable organizations that do not engage in substan
tial lobbying.
Id. at 2000 (footnote omitted).
34
35
36
3'7
38

1984]

LOCAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT

125

intended objectives, Congress has imposed responsibilities upon the
fiduciaries who control these institutions. Not surprisingly, these fi
duciary duties bear a close resemblance to the traditional obligations
of loyalty, productivity, and diversification outlined by the courts of
equity.
Particularly strict is the regulation, by Congress, of the fiducia
ries of private foundations. Under Code section 4941, such fiduciaries
are generally forbidden to sell or lease property to their foundations;
to exchange property with their foundations; to borrow from, or lend
to, their foundations; to provide goods, services or facilities to their
foundations; or to otherwise use or benefit from the foundations' as
sets. Congress' rationale for these proscriptions was that fiduciaries
should not be permitted to benefit from their foundations. An abso
lute prohibition on dealings between foundations and fiduciaries is the
only effective means of policing fiduciary behavior.'^ A fiduciary who
violates the proscriptions of section 4941 is subject to a personal pen
alty tax.'^'
Imprudent investments by private foundation fiduciaries are sim
ilarly prohibited by Congress. Under section 4944, the fiduciary who
knowingly participates in such an investment is subject to personal
liability.'^^
Section 4943, at issue in the second of the Duke Endowment de
cisions, imposes a specific type of diversification requirement upon
private foundations. Under section 4943, a private foundation gener
ally may not own more than 20% of the voting interest in any busi
ness.'*^ Under certain circumstances, the Treasury may permit
ownership of up to 35% of the voting interest of a business.'*^ Foun
dations that hold assets in excess of these limits are subject to penalty
taxes.'*^ While the foundation's fiduciaries are not subject to personal
39 I,R.C. § 4941.
'•o For a discussion of the history and origin of Section 4941, see Zelinsky, Section 4975 and
PTE 77-9: The Causes of Complexity in the Internal Revenue Code, 15 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1, 7-19
(1981).
I.R.C. § 4941(a), (b). "Section 4941 provides for an initial penalty as a result of the
prohibited transaction itself. If the transaction is not remedied within a specified 'correction
period,' an additional, heavier tax is placed upon the culpable disqualified person." Zelinsky,
supra note 40, at 17.
42 I,R.C. § 4944(a)(2).
43 Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
44 Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B).
45 Section 4943 imposes a tax equal to 5% of the value of excess business holdings of any
private foundation during the taxable year. Id. § 4943(a)(1). Where an initial tax is imposed
under subsection (a), and at the close of the taxable period the foundation still has excess
business holdings in that enterprise, there is an additional tax equal to 200% of the value of the
excess holdings. Id. § 4943(b).

126

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:111

liability under section 4943, that provision nevertheless constrains
their behavior since any penalty taxes paid by the foundation would,
as a matter of state law, reflect on the fiduciaries' handling of the
foundation's affairs."*®
Just as Congress viewed private foundations as tax-subsidized in
stitutions whose fiduciaries are appropriately subject to federal regula
tion, Congress has imposed statutory restrictions on the fiduciaries of
profit-sharing and pension plans. Section 4975, modeled after section
4941, generally prohibits the fiduciaries of pension and profit-sharing
plans from selling or leasing property to their plans; from exchanging
with their plans; from engaging in loan transactions with their plans;
from furnishing to, or receiving from, their plans goods, services, and
facilities; and from using, or benefiting from, the assets of their
plans."*' Fiduciaries who engage in these prohibited transactions are
subject to personal penalty taxes."*®
The Internal Revenue Code further conditions the tax-exempt
status of pension and profit-sharing plans upon the use of plan assets
for "the exclusive benefit" of plan participants and beneficiaries."*' As
we shall see below, the exclusive benefit rule has in practice served as
a restraint on the misuse of plan assets by fiduciaries and has been
interpreted as embodying the prudent man requirements of productiv
ity and diversity.^®
Indeed, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")'* effected the wholesale federalization of the fiduciary ob
ligations of pension and profit-sharing trustees. In addition to section
4975, ERISA imposed upon all such trustees a federally enforceable
obligation to invest pension and profit-sharing assets in a prudent and
productive manner." ERISA further imposed on plan trustees an ex
plicit duty to diversify plan assets." Violation of these statutory re
straints may be challenged judicially by the Department of Labor or
On the practical effects of § 4943, see Foundation Sells 19 Buildings For $400 Million in
Divestiture, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1984, at D23, col. 1; Chicago Philanthropy Balks at Sale of
Assets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1983, at Bll, col. 2.
47 I.R.C. § 4975.
48 Id. § 4975(a), (b). "Section 4975 replicates the two tier tax scheme of section 4941,
imposing a first tier tax on the prohibited transaction and a second tier tax if the transaction is
not corrected after the exercise of judicial and appellate review." Zelinsky, supra note 40, at
23.
49 I.R.C. § 401(a)(2). See supra note 12.
50 See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
51 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 935
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1982)).
52 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982).
53 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).

1984]

LOCAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT

ni

by plan participants and beneficiaries.''^ A fiduciary found to have
violated his ERISA obligation to invest prudently and diversely may
be removed from his position and may be required to make restitution
for his breach of duty."
In Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank,^^ the Secretary of Labor
and the participants of a pension plan challenged the investment prac
tices of the plan's fiduciaries as violative of the ERISA-imposed duty
to diversify and invest prudently. The defendant fiduciaries, rather
than placing plan assets in stocks, bonds, or similar properties, had
loaned "virtually all of the [pjlan's assets" back to the companies
sponsoring the plan.'^ In return, the fiduciaries took unsecured prom
issory notes from those companies. Hence, the plan's portfolio con
sisted almost exclusively of notes from the sponsoring employers.'®
The district court, not surprisingly, characterized this practice as
a "complete failure to diversify'"^ and ordered the removal of the de
fendant fiduciaries and the appointment of a new trustee.^
A somewhat more subtle situation was at issue in Marshall v.
Glass/Metal Association & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan,^^
which also arose under the ERISA fiduciary statutes. There, the Sec
retary of Labor sought to enjoin, on diversification and prudence
grounds, a loan by a pension plan before the loan was consummated.
The trustees proposed to lend 23% of the plan's assets to a company
intending to develop a time-sharing vacation project to be marketed
to local residents. The project had already been suspended once for
financial and economic reasons. Moreover, the court found that the
"marketing concept" animating the project "was completely un
tried."" In light of these "special risks," the court concluded that the
proposed loan, if actually made, would violate the trustees' obligation
to diversify. Accordingly, the court enjoined the trustees from mak
ing the loan.®'
Similarly, in Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust
Fund,^ the court, at the instigation of the Secretary of Labor, en
joined pension trustees from making a contemplated loan to finance a
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. § 1132(a).
Id. § 1109(a).
485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
Id. at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 644.
507 F. Supp. 378 (D. Hawaii 1980).
Id. at 382.
Id. at 384-85.
458 F. Supp. 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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hotel and casino in Las Vegas. Finding that the proposed loan would
have utilized 36% of the plan's funds, the court characterized the
loan as "a disproportionate commitment" of the plan's assets and
therefore a violation of the trustees' duty to diversify.^'
The specific details of Freund, Glass/Metal, and Teamsters Local
282 are of less importance than the explicit federalization of the duty
to diversify and invest prudently which they represent. However,
even prior to the adoption of ERISA, the IRS took the position that
the exclusive benefit rule of the Internal Revenue Code imposes upon
pension and profit-sharing trustees the duty to diversify the assets
under their control and to make those assets productive. In Revenue
Ruling 69-494,®^ the IRS stated that an investment by a pension plan
is consistent with the exclusive benefit rule only if, in addition to
meeting other requirements, the investment results in a reasonable
rate of return and the "diversity that a prudent investor" would insist
upon. Subsequently, in Revenue Ruling 73-380,^' the IRS held that a
loan by a plan of "substantially all" of its assets to the sponsoring
employer violated the exclusive benefit rule because of the conse
quently undiversified nature of the plan's portfolio.^®
The IRS' interpretation of the exclusive benefit rule was em
braced by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Central Mo
tor Co. V. United States.^^ In Central Motor, the employer corporation
(Central Motor) was controlled by one Mr. Gurley. Substantially all
of the assets of the Central Motor pension plan were loaned to a sec
ond company. Credit Investment. Credit Investment was controlled
by Mr. Gurley, his son, and his son-in-law.™
On these facts, the court, accepting the teaching of Revenue Rul
ing 69-494, agreed that the plan violated the exclusive benefit rule
because of its failure to diversify.^'
For the purposes of this Article, one major conclusion emerges
from this brief review. In all four of our examples—the university,
the state's pension plan, the church organization's pension plan, and
the construction company's profit-sharing plan—the fiduciaries are le
gally bound to invest prudently, productively, and diversely. For
some of these fiduciaries, the exclusive or primary sources of their
obligations are federal statutes. For other fiduciaries, their duties
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 992.
1969-2 C.B. 88.
1973-2 C.B. 124.
Id. at 124-25.
583 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 490-91.
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emerge from a mixture of federal and state authorities. In substance,
however, all confront essentially the same obligation to invest produc
tively and diversely.
IV.

THE CONCEPT OF THE EXTERNALITY

As Professor Fellner has indicated, externalities are said to arise
"when the production of a good or service creates benefits elsewhere
in the economy, benefits which are external to the buyer-seller rela
tions accompanying the act of production.
Just as the notions of
prudence, productivity, and diversification play a central role in fidu
ciary law, the concept of the externality is critical to contemporary
microeconomic theory.^^
For the theorists of the market, the existence of externalities cre
ates a problem. In the absence of externalities, a free market will, in
conception at least, result in the maximization of the economic wel
fare of those participating in the market.^"* X will consume apples to
the point where the cost of producing apples is justified by the in
crease the apples make upon X's sense of well-being. In the language
of contemporary microeconomics, X will consume apples until his
marginal utility from apples equals the price at which he must buy
them. X, of course, knows that point better than anyone else and
should, therefore, be allowed to move to it on his own and without
interference from others. Hence, X should be free to consume as
many (or as few) apples as he wants.^^
Suppose, however, we are not dealing with goods like apples,
which, when consumed, do not benefit X's neighbor, Y. Suppose in
stead we are discussing a good that, when consumed by X, affects Y—
e.g., the painting of the outside of X's house. X, if left to his own
devices, will improve the outside of his house to the point where the
w. Fellner, Emergence and Content of Modem Economic Analysis 117 (1960).
See, e.g., id. at 116.
This maximization of resources is derived from the concept of pareto-optimality. A
pareto-optimum situation is said to exist when "it is not possible to reallocate resources so as
to improve the well-being (or utility) of one person without making at least one other person
worse off (i.e., reduce their utility)." R. Roadway, Public Sector Economics 5 (1979). In a
perfectly competitive economy, the free market will "lead to an efficient or [p]areto-optimal
allocation of resources." Id. at 29.
In the real world, however, the conditions necessary for efficient markets will rarely, if
ever, exist. The market mechanism will fail to allocate resources efficiently due to the existence
of factors such as externalities, see infra note 76 and accompanying text, public goods, increas
ing returns to scale, risk and uncertainty, and tax distortions. See R. Roadway, supra, at
29-40.
'5 For what some would consider the classic contemporary statement of this view, see G.
Stigler, The Theory of Price (3d ed. 1966).
•72
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cost of improvement is justified by X's sense of the resulting increase
in his welfare. However, the improvement of the exterior of X's
house gives rise to externalities that benefit X's neighbor, Y. The
value of Y's house increases with the upgrading of X's adjoining prop
erty. To put it another way, when X improves his property, he cre
ates secondary benefits for Y.
However, X will generally not be concerned with Y's welfare.
Though additional improvements to X's house are beneficial for Y, X
has no financial incentive to proceed with these improvements. In
theory, Y can reimburse X for the cost of improving X's house and,
indeed, Y will have a financial incentive to do so. The externalities
that benefit Y justify the expenditure by Y of some funds to secure
those benefits.^^
What happens, however, when X is surrounded by ten other
homeowners in addition to Y? The bilateral reimbursement of X by
Y becomes an inadequate response to the situation. Y will expect the
other neighbors to pay for the externalities from which they benefit.
Negotiations between so many property owners are likely to be time
consuming and, possibly, unproductive. Hence, governmental inter
vention (e.g., housing codes, subsidies, tax abatements) may be neces
sary to motivate X to make investments in his house that will impact
favorably on Y and the other neighbors.'^
An externality exists where the actions of one party affect the utility or production pos
sibilities of another without being priced. "The fact that it is not priced implies that the 'emit
ting' party has no incentive to take into consideration the effect, beneficial or detrimental, on
the 'affected' party. That being the case, the emitting party may devote an inefficient amount
of resources to pursuing the activity." R. Boadway, supra note 74, at 91. In order to arrive at
pareto-optimality, the emitting party must consider not only the benefit that he will derive
from the activity, but also the benefit (or detriment) that will be incurred by the affected party.
Thus, a voluntary reimbursement will "internalize" the externality, and a pareto-optimal allo
cation of resources will be achieved.
Theoretically, X and Y can bargain with each other until the desired level of output is
achieved. Y will have the incentive to reimburse X in order to maximize his own utility. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text. However, excessive transaction costs may preclude the
parties from reaching agreement on an optimal allocation of resources. R. Bish & H. Nourse,
Urban Economics and Policy Analysis 114 & n.5 (1975). Similarly, with a large number of
property owners, the voluntary compensation of X becomes more complicated. It may be
impossible, or at the least very costly, to prevent the adjoining property owners from reaping
the benefit of X's activity. Since a voluntary price may not be enforceable, the adjoining prop
erty owners will have an incentive to consume the activity free of charge. This failure of the
free market system is commonly known as the free rider problem. R. Boadway, supra note 74,
at 31.
The failure of the market to allocate resources efficiently has been presented as a justifica
tion for governmental intervention. R. Bish & H. Nourse, supra, at 115; R. Boadway, supra
note 74, at 31. Since a voluntary price mechanism may be unsuccessful in achieving paretooptimality, some kind of coercive device must be implemented in order to provide the parties
with the incentive to take into account the external effects of the activity. Taxation, subsidies.
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The example of X and Y as adjacent homeowners suggests why
the concept of the externality has not played an important role in
traditional fiduciary law. X and Y generate externalities because of
their proximity to one another. Such proximity is obviously a func
tion of urbanization. If X's house is a rural farmhouse, surrounded by
acres of com, the painting of X's house will generate externalities for
no one. Since much of our fiduciary law traces its roots to
preurbanized days, the externalities, so obvious in a modern age, were
generally absent when that law was in its formative stages."'®
Nevertheless, the fiduciary's obligation to make the assets con
fided to him productive should be defined as an obligation to make
productive those assets accounting for all externalities affecting the
fiduciary's beneficiary. The reason for formulating the fiduciary's du
ties in this fashion is straightforward. The fiduciary's obligations are
designed to emulate the prudent investor in the handling of his per
sonal affairs."'' Even if the prudent investor has never heard the term
"externalities," he knows they exist and he accounts for them in his
investment decisions. What prudent owner of urban or suburban real
estate does not recognize and concern himself with the condition of
adjoining parcels? As the goal of fiduciary law is to require fiduciaries
to behave like prudent men, fiduciaries should explicitly be required
to recognize the existence of externalities.
V.

THE LOCAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN CONTEXT: A CLOSER
LOOK AT FOUR EXAMPLES

Against this background, we can examine the proposals ad
vanced to our hypothetical university and to our pension and profitsharing plans. This examination will confirm my central observation
that, because of its externalities, the local social investment will often
be highly productive. However, because of its local nature, it will
generally be among the least diversifying investments available to the
fiduciary. Hence, one traditional criterion of fiduciary law (rate of
return) will frequently impel the making of the local social investment
while another criterion (diversification) will often forbid it.
The benefits of the city's proposal to the university are, at first
blush, clear. In addition to the direct cash return from the proposed
mortgage, the university's downtown real estate holdings should in
crease in value as a result of the projected redevelopment activity. As
and allocation of property rights are examples of government practices that attempt to correct
market failure. Id. at 111-20.
•'s See, e.g., Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
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the university owns a significant portion of downtown real estate, its
holdings will receive a substantial part of the externalities generated
by the redevelopment activity. We can, therefore, say with reasonable
confidence that the rate of return on the proposed mortgage will be in
excess of 8% once we acknowledge the benefits of this investment to
the university's downtown holdings.
Indeed, we can reasonably conclude that the rate of return on
this ostensibly social investment may eventually equal or surpass that
of more conventional opportunities available to the university. The
difference in direct return between the proposed mortgage and alter
native investments is $200,000 per year—the 2% difference between
an 8% return on $10 million and a 10% return on that same amount.
If we modestly assume that the university's downtown holdings will
appreciate on an annual basis by an extra 0.4% as a result of the
proposed project, then the extra appreciation of $200,000 per year
equalizes the rate of return of the proposed mortgage with the return
on more conventional investments.®" Indeed, if we assume that the
extra appreciation of the university's holdings will constitute 0.5%
per year, the rate of return on the social investment will actually ex
ceed that on more conventional assets.®'
This analysis only focuses upon the externalities to be derived by
the university's investment holdings in the downtown area. The uni
versity, however, owns a second type of real estate that will benefit
from the proposed project. The campus, or more precisely the por
tion that adjoins downtown, will also benefit from the improvement of
the downtown area. The campus may be viewed by the university as
an economic asset, potentially saleable or available to collateralize
loans to the university. If so, the rate of return on the proposed mort
gage, adjusted to reflect the additional externalities upon the univer
sity's campus real estate, may go even higher.
Hence, if we look only at the rate of return, the proposed social
investment is potentially attractive for the university whether or not
the university wants to help the city. The university's own interests, if
defined as the rate of return, are potentially sufficient to impel the
university to extend the proposed mortgage.
However, while the proposed mortgage may be a good invest
ment in terms of its rate of return, it is difficult to imagine a less diIt was hypothesized that the university has holdings in downtown Westville that are
worth $50 million. See supra text accompanying note 5. An extra 0.4% of annual apprecia
tion on $50 million is $200,000.
Extra annual appreciation of 0.5% on the university's $50 million holdings in downtown
Westville would amount to $250,000 per year. This more than compensates for the $200,000
the university will forego by extending the lower interest mortgage.
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verse investment for the university. The university's economic
fortunes are already heavily tied to those of Westville. Of the univer
sity's endowment dollars, one in six is already invested in downtown
Westville and the university's campus represents an additional $100
million investment in the town. Thus, over 37% of the university's
wealth is tied up with the fate of Westville.®^ The proposed mortgage
would further entwine the university's financial fortunes with those of
Westville. From the viewpoint of diversification, the proposed mort
gage is a bad deployment of the university's resources.
It is useful to contrast the mortgage proposed to the university by
the city with the demand that the university divest itself of militaryrelated stocks. That demand, if acceded to by the university, would
reduce the range of investments available to the university. However,
even if the university divested itself of the stocks of all companies that
derive substantial income from military sales, it could still select from
many issues listed on the New York and American exchanges. The
university would still be able to invest in blue chip and growth stocks.
While the university's discretion to purchase stocks would be nar
rowed, it could still maintain a fairly diversified portfolio.
On the other hand, a military-sensitive investment policy would
not generate any secondary economic benefits like the externalities of
the mortgage proposal for the university's real estate. If the move
ment of assets from military-based industries to nonmilitary invest
ments will lower the cash rate of return (and the university's advisors
think that it might), the university will indeed suffer economically as a
result of the decision to divest military-based stocks.
In short, though both the mortgage proposal and the demand to
divest military stocks are commonly styled social investments, they
pose significantly different choices for the university in terms of diver
sification and rate of return.
The dilemma of the local social investment reappears when we
examine the proposal to the profit-sharing trustees of the home con
struction company. If implemented, the proposal to invest profitsharing assets in low-rate mortgages will generate two externalities for
the plan and its participants: additional mortgage money will mean
more home construction and thus more work for plan participants.
More home construction in Elmtown should also increase corporate
profits and thus increase contributions to the corporation's profitsharing plan.
82 The university's assets total $400 million; its $100 million campus and its $300 million
endowment. The campus and the university's downtown holdings represent $150 million of
this $400 million, or 37.5% of the total.
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Looking at the rate of return, it is not difficult to conclude that
plan participants may be better off if the proposal to the trustees for
home mortgage loans is accepted. Let us assume, for example, that
the typical participant has a balance of $10,000 in the plan. Hence,
$1,000 of his profit-sharing funds will be invested in the mortgage pro
gram at a return 2% less than the return otherwise obtainable.^^ The
local social investment initially "costs" this participant $20, repre
senting the first year's lower return on $1,000 of his profit-sharing
funds. Over the course of three years, the local social investment re
sults in a direct cash return $60 less than the participant would other
wise receive.®'*
However, if the mortgage program is successful, the corporation
will contribute additional funds to his profit-sharing account. If this
additional contribution comes to $60, the participant's account will be
fully restored to the level it would have attained at market rates. If
the additional contribution to the participant's account exceeds $60,
the participant has, paradoxically, made money through the low-rate
investment.
Moreover, these calculations ignore what the participants may
consider the most important externality: work or, more precisely, the
additional income each participant will receive as a result of the addi
tional work generated for him by the mortgage program.
However, the trustees must confront the question of diversifica
tion. Here again we see the problem of the local social investment.
The financial fates of the plan and of its participants are already en
twined with the economy of Elmtown in general, and Elmtown's
housing market in particular. Making the plan a mortgagee of
Elmtown real estate further ties the fortunes of the plan to those of
Elmtown. The absence of diversification would become particularly
acute if the plan, as mortgagee, were forced to foreclose on any of the
homes it had financed. The plan, in attempting to sell these existing
homes, could find itself competing with the corporation and its efforts
to encourage new housing construction.
The solar-based investment urged upon the trustees by local envi
ronmental groups also entails certain disadvantages. The securities of
any new company must be considered risky. When the company's
product is of an experimental nature, the risks must be considered
even greater. Whatever the propects for long-term growth in the so
lar-equipment industry, it is unlikely that the securities proposed to
The funds to be invested in low-rate mortgages represent one-tenth of the plan's current
assets. See text accompanying note 6.
8^ That is, the participant will earn 2% less on $1,000, i.e., $20, for three years.
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the trustees will generate significant returns in the company's early
years.
Nevertheless, the environmentalists' proposal has one great ad
vantage over the mortgage plan: the environmentalists' investment
would diversify the trustees out of the homebuilding market and the
Elmtown market in particular. As we have seen, the mortgage propo
sal would subject the profit-sharing plan to a form of economic double
jeopardy. Corporate profits and thus profit-sharing contributions are
already at the mercy of the Elmtown housing market. The mortgage
proposal would further tie the plan's economic fate to Elmtown hous
ing by making the plan a mortgagee of part of that housing.
In contrast, the corporation advocated by the environmentalists
will make solar equipment for use in sections of the country other
than Elmtown. Moreover, that equipment is industrial rather than
residential in nature. Whatever the overall merits of the two social
investments advanced to our hypothetical profit-sharing trustees, the
mortgage proposal is clearly inferior to the solar proposal from the
viewpoint of diversification.
At first blush, it appears that the participants in the church or
ganization's defined benefit pension plan would be indifferent to the
social investment proposals advanced to the plan's trustees. Because
the plan is of the defined benefit variety, each participant is guaran
teed a specific retirement benefit. If the plan's investment perform
ance is inadequate to provide the promised benefit, the employer
organization must make up the difference from its own funds.®'
Moreover, the insurance provided by the PBGC guarantees a feder
ally determined level of pension benefits for each participant.®^ Con
sequently, plan participants probably would not care how the trustees
invest the funds confided to them.
On further reflection, however, the matter is not so clear. The
PBGC currently insures only about $15,000 of each participant's an
nual pension benefit.®"' While this figure will rise with the cost of liv
ing, a portion of retirement benefits for higher paid employees may
never be guaranteed by the PBGC. For example, the plan promises a
senior employee currently making a salary of $80,000 per year an an
nual retirement pension of $48,000.®® Less than half of this benefit
85 See supra note 8.
86 See supra note 9.
8'7 See PBGC News Release, 4 Pens. & Profit Sharing (P-H) H 135,520 (Dec. 10, 1980) (the
maximum pension guaranteed for plans that terminated in 1981 was $1,261.36 per month;
however, the average monthly benefit paid was substantially less).
88 The participant's projected benefit is 60% of his final salary, which now looks like

$80,000.
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would be insured by the PBGC in the case of employer default.
Moreover, the prospects of employer default cannot be dismissed
lightly. A plan participant currently in his early thirties must wait
approximately three decades to receive his pension benefit. It is al
most impossible for him to predict with any confidence what the or
ganization's financial capacity will be at the time of his retirement. It
is quite possible that the employer's commitment to make good on the
promised benefit may not be worth much thirty years from now.®'
The nature of the employer ought to engender some concern on
the part of the plan participant. He is, after all, not working for a blue
chip industrial giant but for a voluntary, nonprofit organization,
which, in the past, has seen significant fluctuations in membership
and income. The employer's guarantee of the participant's projected
benefit necessarily relies on the organization's ability to attract and
retain dues-paying churches.
The plan participant should be concerned about the employer's
financial position in one other respect. Lower investment returns by
the trustees will increase both the immediate and long-term liability of
the employer to make up the difference between the funds in the plan
and the funds needed to provide the plan's promised benefits. If the
organization's actual or potential liability under the pension plan be
comes too great, it might respond by either terminating the plan, or
by freezing current salaries and thus freezing plan benefits. Either
alternative, of course, would have an adverse impact upon plan
participants.
In short, the plan participants, particularly those with benefits
projected in excess of the level guaranteed by the PBGC, have a sig
nificant interest in the employer's financial condition and the trustees'
investment performance. The proposal to extend below market rate
mortgages to churches in poor areas should be evaluated in that light.
In view of the organization's history, the mortgage proposal may
be a desirable one for the plan's participants. The externality here—
the churches' commitment to affiliate and pay dues for the ten years—
strengthens the value of the organization's guarantee of the benefit
promised by the plan. As we saw, that guarantee is no better than the
organization's own financial strength. By bolstering the income of the
church organization for a ten-year period, the mortgage proposal en89 The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94
Stat. 1208, was, in large measure, a response to the PBGC's meager resources relative to the
enormous unfunded pension liabilities which exist in multiemployer plans. See H.R. Rep. No.
869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-57, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2918,
2920-25.
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hances the probability that the promised benefit will be paid if the
organization must provide the benefit out of its own funds.
However, serious questions must be asked about the mortgage
proposal under the heading of diversification. The financial well-be
ing of the plan participants is already closely tied to the economic
welfare of the churches affiliated with the organization. If those
churches experience a decline in membership or financial hardship
that impedes the regular payment of dues, the organization's income
will suffer, with evident consequences for the employees, their sala
ries, and the organization's ability to pay pension contributions. The
proposal to extend mortgages to affiliated churches compounds the
participants' vulnerability to the churches' fortunes. If the mort
gagor-churches experience difficult times, not only will they have
trouble making significant payments to the organization, but in all
likelihood they will have trouble paying their mortgages as well. Plan
participants could thus lose doubly from declines in the fortunes of
the participating churches, once because of reduced membership in
come, and a second time because of mortgage default.
Moreover, if mortgage default reflects the further economic dete
rioration of the areas in which the mortgagor churches are located,
the plan's position may be seriously imperiled. Compelled to fore
close, the plan could find that those church buildings are of little re
sale value.
We can contrast the mortgage proposal to the church organiza
tion's trustees with the suggestion that the trustees divest stocks in
companies conducting business directly or indirectly with South Af
rica and then reinvest the proceeds in companies without such con
tacts. The latter proposal will not generate any externalities for the
plan: there are no secondary economic benefits from the proposed di
vestiture and reinvestment in firms that do not do business in South
Africa.
However, the anti-apartheid proposal results in greater diversifi
cation for the plan and its participants than does the proposal to ex
tend mortgages to churches in low income areas. The fate of the plan
is tied substantially to the ability of these churches, which pay dues to
the national organization, to attract and retain members. The mort
gage proposal would further entwine the interests of the plan and its
participants with the fortunes of these churches. By contrast, if the
plan invests some of its assets in companies because of their
noninvolvement in South Africa, there will be no external effect on
the plan. The performance of these companies will only affect the
growth, or lack thereof, of the plan's assets. The economic fates of
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these firms would not also affect the income of the employer organiza
tion and, consequently, its capacity to make good on the promised
pension benefits.
In short, while the local social investment is most easily con
ceived of in geographic terms, the externalities and lack of diversifica
tion that typify this kind of investment can be present in other
situations.
An analysis of the proposal made to the state employees' pension
plan makes a point, which, if perhaps obvious, nevertheless ought to
be articulated: the mere existence of externalities cannot justify the
local social investment. The externalities must be of sufficient magni
tude to offset the lower direct return of that investment and must be
captured by the fiduciary for the benefit of his beneficiaries. In the
case of the proposal to the state pension plan, it appears that the pro
posed investments do not generate adequate externalities and that the
externalities that do result do not benefit the plan's beneficiaries.
Therefore, the proposed investment should not be made.
The externality to be realized from the low interest mortgages is
increased tax revenue. That revenue will result from the sales tax col
lected on the purchase of materials for homes that otherwise would
not be built and from the real estate conveyance tax on sales that
would not take place in the absence of the low-rate mortgage plan.
However, none of these tax revenues will be shared with the plan par
ticipants. The plan requires the state to contribute 5% of each par
ticipant's current salary annually. An increase in tax revenue as a
result of the mortgage program would not generate increased contri
butions for the state's employees and thus does not counterbalance
the depressed investment performance resulting from the low rate
mortgages. Moreover, the state's financial position is reasonably good
and, therefore, the strengthening of the state's revenues is, at best, of
marginal importance to the plan participants.
In addition, if low interest mortgages are granted with the plan's
assets, the plan's rate of return will be lower than it otherwise would
be. Consequently, the funds available for distribution to employees at
retirement will also be less.
For the plan participants, there is no need to examine this propo
sal from the viewpoint of diversification since the rate of return (10%
with no externalities) is so unappealing.
VI.

THE RECIPROCAL LOCAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT

It would, of course, be possible to alter the facts of the foregoing
examples and thereby shift their tone and emphasis. We could, for
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example, postulate that a smaller portion of the university's endow
ment has already been invested in downtown Westville and thereby
reduce diversification problems with, and externalities from, the city's
mortgage proposal. Or we could hypothesize greater problems quan
tifying secondary benefits than are evident in my examples.
Nevertheless, despite the possibility of tinkering with the details
of my examples, they do establish the major points: local social invest
ments are fundamentally different from global social investments.
Despite a lower direct return, the local social investment can fre
quently be highly productive since some of its externalities will inure
to the benefit of the fiduciary's beneficiaries and thus increase the in
vestment's rate of return. On the other hand, the local social invest
ment will typically be among the least diversifying choices available to
the fiduciary.
The fiduciary confronted by proposals for local social invest
ments could be paralyzed by this dilemma and respond by making no
such investments at all. If he eschews all such local investments, the
fiduciary runs no risk of managing an undiversified portfolio.
The problem with this essentially negative approach is that the
local social investment will, because of its externalities, often be
highly productive. The defensive decision to eschew all local social
investments may depress the fiduciary's rate of return below levels
otherwise obtainable by ignoring a category of investments which may
be among the most productive available.
Nevertheless, the lack of diversification inherent in the local so
cial investment cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. If the local
social investment becomes unprofitable (a possibility that exists with
any type of investment), the fiduciary may find himself in the uncom
fortable position of defending an investment which he knew ab initio
would decrease the diversification of his portfolio. Even if the fiduci
ary is confident that he could ultimately justify his decision in the
appropriate forums, the prospect of extended proceedings in the state
or federal courts is not an attractive one.
I suggest that there is a solution to the dilemma of the local so
cial investment. That solution is for fiduciaries to reciprocate each
other's local social investments.
Let us reconsider the position in which our hypothetical univer
sity finds itself. The mortgage proposal will undoubtedly enhance the
university's real estate holdings. It will, however, further tie the uni
versity's economic fortunes to those of Westville. Supppose, however,
that the university knows of another institutional investor in a similar
situation, e.g., the church organization. The university and the

140

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:111

church organization could enter into a contractual commitment to
invest in each other's project: the church organization's pension plan
would grant the mortgage for the renewal of downtown Westville
while the university would extend mortgages to the churches affiliated
with the organization. From the perspective of rate of return, this
reciprocation of local social investments produces the same result as if
each institution had invested in its own project. The university's re
turn on the church mortgages will be the same as it would have re
ceived on the investment in downtown Westville. The university will
receive interest of 8%, plus the externalities derived from the church
organization's extension of a mortgage in Westville that will benefit
the university's real estate. By the same token, the church organiza
tion's cash return on the Westville mortgage will equal the return it
would have received on the mortgages to its affiliates. In addition, the
organization, by deploying its assets in Westville, secures the benefits
of the university's investment in its affiliated churches.
Most importantly, the reciprocation by the university and church
organization of their respective local social investments frees each
from the diversification dilemma. The university will not be required
to further concentrate its assets in Westville, but will invest in differ
ent areas in different parts of the country. Similarly, the church or
ganization can diversify some of its economic fortunes out of the
ambit of its affiliated churches.
In short, the reciprocation of local social investments mitigates, if
not eliminates, the diversification problems inherent in such invest
ments. By exchanging local social investments, fiduciaries can diver
sify their portfolios while still guaranteeing that capital is deployed in
projects that generate significant externalities for the fiduciaries'
beneficiaries.
As a practical matter, the establishment of a permanent, nation
wide clearinghouse would be necessary to accomplish the reciproca
tion of local social investments on a regular basis. On the simplest
level, such a clearinghouse would permit various fiduciaries to learn
of each other's existence and of the investments each desires to recip
rocate. On a more complex level, the clearinghouse could play a role
in arranging multiparty exchanges of local social investments. In my
examples, the proposals to the church organization and the university
are of exactly equal size: each has been requested to loan $10 million.
On these facts, each can satisfy the other's needs by merely recipro
cating between themselves.
Suppose, however, that the proposal to the university is for a $12
million mortgage. The church organization, still only needing $10
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million for its purposes, might be reluctant to commit to Westville
any more than the organization needs to have invested with its affili
ated churches. Similarly, the university might prefer that an outside
investor extend the entire $12 million mortgage rather than only part
of it.
One solution to this quandary is to coordinate a three-party ex
change of local investments. The university could invest $10 million
in church mortgages to be reciprocated by the church organization
with a $10 million mortgage for downtown development in Westville.
In addition, the university could invest another $2 million in the
Elmtown mortgage proposal in return for a $2 million loan by the
Elmtown home construction corporation to the Westville project.
As we move from simple two-party exchanges to multiparty ar
rangements, the role of the central clearinghouse becomes one of a
broker, styling different packages in light of the various proposals reg
istered with it.
In its ultimate shape, the clearinghouse could form the
equivalent of mutual funds, pooling a variety of local social invest
ments into a single, internally-diversified investment vehicle. Sup
pose, for example, that in any year there are forty fiduciaries with
local social investment proposals totalling $100 million. Suppose fur
ther that our hypothetical university's mortgage project is one of
those proposals.
The clearinghouse could organize a pool to which the university
would contribute $10 million. In turn, the pool would extend the $10
million mortgage to the developer for the rehabilitation of downtown
Westville. Similarly, the remaining $90 million in the pool would be
used to make the local investments desired by the other participating
fiduciaries.
For its $10 million, the university would thus secure the benefit
of its local investment and a diversified pro rata interest in each of the
other investments in the pool.
In practice, assembling such a pool will not be without its diffi
culties. Different investments contributed to the pool will generate
different direct rates of return and will entail differing degrees of risk.
Accordingly, potential investors may be willing to partake in some of
the pool's investments, but not in others. The university may be will
ing to extend a pro rata portion of the mortgage for Elmtown home
buyers, but it may not be willing to invest in the mortgages for
churches in low income areas. If we divide a single pool into smaller,
separate pools, each with fewer investments, we increase the possibil-
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ity that any given pool may be acceptable to a potential investor, but
simultaneously decrease the diversity within each smaller pool.
In short, I do not minimize the practical problems involved in
the establishment of mutual funds of local social investments. How
ever, those problems do not seem insuperable or sufficient to preclude
some initial experimentation with the establishment of such funds.
Among the issues that must be considered are who would organ
ize such a clearinghouse and who would pay for its operation. Per
haps the most likely initial candidate is a foundation interested in
social investing. If a foundation were to undertake to establish a
clearinghouse and fund its initial period of operation, much useful
information could be obtained, e.g., the number of institutions with
projects to reciprocate; the total annual volume of local social invest
ments contributed to the clearinghouse; the rate of return obtained by
participants in the clearinghouse.
In short, this initial period of experimentation, during which the
administrative costs of the clearinghouse would be subsidized by a
foundation, would indicate whether there is, in fact, a demand for the
services of the clearinghouse and whether, without the foundation's
funding, the clearinghouse could be a self-sustaining enterprise.
If the results achieved by the clearinghouse are sufficiently
favorable, the clearinghouse could be transformed into a self-financing
organization. Institutions participating in the clearinghouse would
pay fees designed to cover their respective shares of the clearing
house's overhead. The clearinghouse would thus resemble a loaded
mutual fund. Indeed, if the initial period of foundation-subsidized op
eration indicated the feasibility of the clearinghouse as a self-sus
taining entity, the organizers of commercial mutual funds might find
it profitable to organize and operate such clearinghouses.
Several financial organizations are examining the possibilities of
establishing mutual funds for those concerned about socially sensitive
investing. If the financial viability of a clearinghouse could be demon
strated during a period of foundation-subsidized operation, these fi
nancial organizations might consider forming clearinghouses for the
reciprocation of local social investments.
VII.

QUANTIFICATION, PRUDENCE, AND NONECONOMIC
BENEFITS

The otherwise sympathetic reader may now feel compelled to in
terject three reservations. First, it may be suggested that my analysis
requires fiduciaries to project and quantify the externalities to be ob
tained from proposed local social investments. Such prognostication
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and quantification is somewhat problematic. Second, it may be ar
gued that permitting fiduciaries to account for externalities could pos
sibly lead them to advance their own social and political goals at the
expense of their beneficiaries. Fiduciaries might simply predict exter
nalities to justify and rationalize the fiduciaries' own policy prefer
ences. Third, it may also be observed that my argument defines
externalities in strictly financial terms and ignores the noneconomic
benefits to be derived from potential investments.
My argument does assume that fiduciaries can, within reason,
predict the financial consequences of proposed local social invest
ments and quantify those consequences. I presume, for example, that
my hypothetical university can anticipate, with reasonable certainty,
the financial impact upon its real estate holdings of the proposed
downtown development project. Similarly, I assume that pension and
profit-sharing trustees can predict, and quantify, the impact of pro
posed investments upon the rates of return of the plans that the trust
ees supervise.
Predicting the future is problematic; quantifying the future, more
so. Thus, it might be suggested that the impossibility of ever really
knowing what externalities to expect makes it dangerous, if not im
possible, for fiduciaries to consider those externalities in making in
vestment decisions.
To this concern, I advance two replies. First, there are tools
available for making financial predictions of this type. It is impossible
to read any major financial publication without perceiving the wide
array of appraisal and investment analysis services available to
investors.'"
Second, and perhaps more compelling, my argument assumes no
more (and no less) ability to predict and quantify the effects of poten
tial investments than does current law. It is assumed by current law
that the fiduciary can identify and invest in the most appropriate op
portunities available to him. Fiduciaries are already required to prog
nosticate about rates of return and appreciation of capital when they
make investments. My analysis thus assumes no more competence to
divine future trends than does existing law.
In summary, the argument that fiduciaries will be required to
predict and quantify the economic effects of local social investments
proves too much. If such predictions and quantifications are beyond
See, e.g., Pensions & Investment Age, Jan. 23, 1984, at 88 (advertisements for invest
ment research); id. at 90 (monographs available from the Financial Analysts Research
Foundation).
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the competence of fiduciaries, then existing law, which presumes such
competence as well, is similarly flawed.
As to the argument that the prediction of externalities will be
come an excuse for the fiduciaries' own policy preferences, I would
observe that fiduciaries' predictions of expected externalities, like all
of their other actions, are subject to the standard requirements of pru
dence and loyalty. Hence, fiduciaries are required to predict secon
dary economic benefits reasonably and in good faith, predicated on
the financial well-being of the fiduciaries' beneficiaries. Thus, a
breach of duty occurs either when a fiduciary predicts externalities
from an investment without an adequate basis for such a prediction,
or when he makes a prediction to advance his own political or per
sonal agenda rather than the beneficiaries'.
My argument does define externalities in strictly financial terms.
I do not consider, for example, the possibility that the downtown de
velopment project, by making Westville a more attractive place in
which to live, will help the university recruit students or faculty.®'
Similarly, I do not consider the possibility that a policy of noninvolvement with firms tied to South Africa will make the university more
enticing to a type of pupil or professor the university seeks to
attract.®^
It is not that I deny that noneconomic benefits may exist from
any social investment. It is, however, my position that we lack any
firm consensus for identifying and evaluating these benefits and that,
accordingly, we are not ready (if we ever will be) to account for these
benefits in fiduciary law.
The criteria for identifying and evaluating economic benefits are
well established and essentially noncontroversial, largely because of
their simplicity: a higher return is preferable to a lower return; capital
appreciation is better than capital depreciation; more capital apprecia
tion is better than less capital appreciation.
No such consensus exists as to noneconomic criteria. One man's
environmentalism is, for another, a bias against economic growth.
I should note the theoretical possibility that a more attractive urban environment will
allow the university to pay lower faculty salaries and charge higher tuition. If these economic
benefits genuinely exist, they would increase the rate of return on the university's investment in
downtown Westville. That, however, would still leave the question whether the noneconomic
benefits vis-a-vis the university's student body and faculty ought be considered in the univer
sity's decision to invest in downtown Westville.
Similarly, if the adoption of anti-apartheid investment policies genuinely allows the uni
versity to charge higher tuition or pay lower faculty salaries, that would be an economic exter
nality to be considered by the university's trustees. However, the question of the noneconomic
aspects of an anti-apartheid policy still remain.
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Disengagement from South Africa is a moral imperative for some, a
disservice to South Africa's black majority for others. Even the
noneconomic consequences of the revitalization of downtown
Westville are far from clear—potential students for the university's
school of social work might prefer a different kind of environment for
their research and practice.
Hence, the omission of noneconomic benefits from my calcula
tions is deliberate and, I suggest, defensible. Until there is a more
widespread consensus as to the existence and extent of these benefits,
we cannot tell fiduciaries to account for them.'^
CONCLUSION

As the decade progresses, we can expect that, for many fiduci
aries, the dilemma of the local social investment will grow more
acute. As America's industrial heartland seeks to revitalize itself, as
America's cities cope with the imperatives of economic renewal, and
as America's states and municipalities confront the need to house
America's next generation, the growing assets of foundations, endow
ments, and pension and profit-sharing plans will represent an attrac
tive source of capital with which to accomplish these tasks.
It will not do to ritualistically reiterate fiduciaries' duty of loyalty
to their beneficiaries and, on that basis, to decline all opportunities for
local social investments. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the lo
cal social investment will often be highly productive, sometimes more
productive than the conventional deployment of assets by the fiduci
ary. Blanket opposition to local social investments may thus result in
significantly lower rates of return than would otherwise be obtainable.
On the other hand, it will prove equally unsatisfactory to treat
foundation, endowment, and pension and profit-sharing assets as
freely available for any project that promotes the greater good of the
commonwealth. Retirees have a legitimate expectation that the funds
upon which they rely for postemployment income will be invested in a
manner that secures their interests. Taxpayers who subsidize tax-ex
empt institutions for particular purposes are similarly entitled to have
those institutions satisfy the specific purposes for which exemption is
granted rather than more generalized social goals that may or may
not be appropriately financed by the federal treasury.
The core of the problem is that the local social investment conThis is not the place for a comprehensive jurisprudential analysis of the nature of fiduci
ary relationships. For those interested in such an analysis, see Jacobson, The Private Use of
Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 599
(1980).
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fronts the fiduciary with a dilemma. The local social investment may
be among the most productive available to the fiduciary, since the
investment's rate of return will include a portion of any externalities
generated by the investment. However, it will be among the least di
versifying available to the fiduciary since, in general, the fiduciary will
already possess a significant investment in the locality.
My solution to this dilemma might, in practice, prove rather
complex. The reciprocation of local social investments is advanced,
not because it can be done easily, but because it constitutes the only
practical resolution of this quandary. To those who prefer an intellec
tually purer or administratively simpler solution to the dilemma of
the local social investment, I can do no better than declare that the
solutions to important dilemmas are rarely pure and never simple.®'*
O. Wilde, "The Importance of Being Earnest," Act One (John W. Luce & Co. 1906).

